Perry v FH Brundle  EWHC 2737
The court was required to consider whether a judge of the Intellectual Property Enterprise Court had jurisdiction to make an extended civil restraint order under CPR PD 3C para.3.1.
Under that provision, “a judge of the High Court” had jurisdiction to make an extended civil restraint order.
- Â A judge of the IPEC was sitting as “a judge of the High Court”
- The limitation in para.3.1 turned on the court in which the application was made.
Â Extended civil restraint orders had previously been granted by deputy High Court judges.
The authority of those judges was derived from the Senior Courts Act 1981 s.9(1).
To the extent that qualification as “a judge of the High Court” was wholly or partially satisfied if the individual was sitting as a judge nominated under s.9(1), that criterion was satisfied by a judge sitting in the IPEC.
A judge of the IPEC therefore had jurisdiction to make extended civil restraint orders (see paras 17-18 of judgment).
The IPEC was the successor to the Patents County Court. It was created as a specialist list of the Chancery Division of the High Court and, from 1 October 2013, all proceedings that commenced in the PCC were transferred to it.
The IPEC had jurisdiction that was co-extensive with the Chancery Division. Since the meaning of “a judge of the High Court” was not limited to a judge of the High Court, there was no reason why the court’s jurisdiction was otherwise limited in relation to extended civil restraint orders.
The term “a judge of the High Court” in para.3.1 and the term “High Court judge” in para.3.7 carried the same meaning within the confines of PD3C.